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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on emerging country financial systems 
has shown that a robust banking sector is important 
for transition countries. It can provide monetary 
payments at lower cost, mobilise and allocate funds in 
the most efficient way and improve saving and 
investment required for sustainable economic growth. 
However, these intermediation activities were absent 
in centrally planned economies. Thus, in the early 
stages of transition to a market economy two major 
reforms were required. The first was the introduction 
of a two-tier banking system to separate the central 
bank from the commercial banking sector. This also 
included the division of large industrial banks into 
smaller organisations to create competition in the 
sector. This resulted in a move away from a system 
where the primary goal of the banks was to transfer 
state funds to state-owned enterprises for investment 
projects approved by central planning to a system 
suitable for a market economy. The incumbent 
systems were inefficient in terms of resource 
allocation and the quality of banking supervision and 
risk assessment was poor. The second was the 
establishment of a system of financial intermediation 
to increase saving and investment. The importance of 
these reforms was recognised by the governments of 
all the transition economies. However, while the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States began structural reforms in the 1990’s 
and have to a large extent created efficient banking 
sectors, in Central Asia this process is still being 
developed and is currently far from complete.   
It has now been two decades since the collapse 
of the Soviet system and many previous centrally 
planned economies have established market-based 
economies with most countries following a similar 
approach to overcoming the legacy of the Soviet 
system. Although the speed and sequence of reform 
varied across countries, all were influenced by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the so 
called Washington consensus, which focused on 
liberalisation, stabilisation and the privatisation. The 
mono-banks were abolished and restrictions on 
internal convertibility of money removed, state 
control of interest rates was suspended and the 
privatisation of state-owned banks took place very 
early although with varying degrees of success (Fries 
and Taci, 2002).  
At the initial stages of reform, the reduction of 
government subsidies to state enterprises adversely 
affected the real sector, which resulted in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of non-performing 
loans in the financial statements of newly established 
domestic banks. At the same time, liberal licensing 
policies governing the entry of new banks, weak 
regulatory and supervisory laws and a lack of 
experienced specialists in the banking sector 
contributed to a banking crisis in most transition 
countries during the 1990’s (Marton and McCarthy, 
2008). To avoid a complete collapse of the banking 
sector, transition governments were required to 
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oversee legislation that created new bank laws and 
prudential regulations to facilitate the development of 
the financial sector. It was also necessary to ensure 
their implementation, which including training for 
senior bank officers and central bank personnel. Some 
governments have been successful in establishing a 
sound banking sector, while in others high levels of 
inefficiency remain. There are a number of reasons 
for this, for example, the initial conditions were 
important factors in transition country privatisation 
programmes, but also the maturity of the institutions 
affected the robustness of the legal system while 
policy led reforms on interest rates, currency 
exchange and foreign trade liberalisation had a major 
influence on the success or failure of the banking 
system. But, perhaps the most important 
considerations related to the pre-Soviet history of 
these nations, an aspect which has been hitherto 
ignored in any discussion of economic transition. 
There has been a plethora of research on the 
progress of the transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and more recently the Baltic States, 
particularly on the measurement of banking sector 
efficiency and models to determine the factors that 
influence best practice. However, the Central Asian 
countries have been largely neglected due to lack of 
data. Thus the objectives of this paper are first to 
investigate banking sector performance in Central 
Asia and secondly to explain the difference between 
efficiency of banks in Central Asia and in the Baltic 
States. The reason why such a comparison is 
interesting is that while they have very different 
histories, both groups of countries are previous 
constituent republics which were essentially 
ethnically based administrative units subordinated to 
the Soviet Union. Thus, they are very different from 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The analysis focuses on profit efficiency as the 
recent literature has moved from the estimation of 
cost and production functions and started to explore 
the measurement of efficiency using profit and 
revenue frontiers. Profit efficiency is concerned with 
both cost and revenue efficiency, but only under 
certain conditions would it be likely that the former 
will equal the sum of the latter. This is because cost 
(and revenue) efficiency presumes that the observed 
level of output (input) is already profit maximising, 
which may or may not be the case in practice, and 
particularly in countries where most markets are not 
fully competitive. In addition, there may be 
differences in the quality of some financial services 
that are not captured in the output measures. This may 
make high-quality producers appear to be cost 
inefficient because of the extra expenses associated 
with producing the higher quality output. Such a 
problem may be resolved by using a profit function 
because high quality should be rewarded in the 
market by extra revenue that offsets the extra expense.  
Existing studies have already established the 
determinants of profit efficiency in Central Eastern 
European countries, including the Baltic States, 
however this has not been established for Central Asia 
and the region has not been included in any 
comparative analyses. This is now possible as there 
are sufficient years of data and the paper uses the 
most recent information available, which comprises 
86 banks in total (48 from Central Asia and 38 from 
the Baltic States) for the period 1996-2011. The 
analysis progresses in two stages. The first is the 
estimation of a stochastic frontier profit function from 
which the efficiency levels are derived and 
comparisons made between the Baltic States and the 
Central Asian countries. The second models the 
determinants of profit efficiency for the Central Asian 
countries only as this is already established in the 
literature for the CEE countries and the Baltic States. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II 
discusses the unique characteristics of Central Asia, 
explains why the region is interesting and important 
and different from the earlier reforming centrally 
planned economies and provides the motivation for 
the comparison with the Baltic States. This is 
followed by a brief outline of the nature of banking in 
the two regions. Section III reviews the literature on 
modelling bank performance and efficiency frontiers 
in the context of transition economies, including cost 
and profit functions, which is the approach taken in 
this paper. Section IV describes the models and data 
and compares the efficiency scores between the Baltic 
States and the countries of Central Asia.  Section V 
discusses the results for the determinants of profit 
efficiency in the Central Asian banking sector. The 
last section concludes.  
 
2. Characteristics of Central Asian 
Economies 
 
During the last two decades, much research has 
focussed on the transition of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe from a system of central planning 
to a market economy. However, the countries of 
Central Asia have been largely ignored due to the lack 
of reliable information. Therefore, an analysis of the 
financial sector and level of economic development in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan is timely. These countries are substantially 
different from both the early transition countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the other former 
USSR republics. First, Central Asia is rich in mineral 
and energy resources with all the benefits that result 
in terms of economic growth but also the potential 
internal conflicts associated with this. Second, Central 
Asia was the poorest region of the former Soviet 
Union. It was largely rural with very little general 
infrastructure and few large urban conurbations. 
Kazakhstan was the only republic with more than half 
of the population residing in urban areas and therefore 
the provision of banking services has historically been 
very sparse across the region. Thirdly, the region is 
geographically very extensive and political instability 
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from neighbours such as Afghanistan can be 
contagious and therefore ensuring economic growth is 
vital to retain social cohesion and sustained 
development. Finally, the Central Asian republics 
were controlled by the communist regime for more 
than seventy years. This resulted in the lack of a 
national collective memory of any other form of 
economic organisation or institutions in these 
countries and no experience of managing a domestic 
market economy prior to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Central Asia was the most 
conservative part of the Soviet Union and even during 
the Gorbachev era in the late 1980s when reforms to 
establish a market economy took place in several 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States, these republics did not follow. This 
provides a sharp contrast to countries such as 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the former 
Czechoslovakia, which only had a system of central 
planning for the period following the Second World 
War until the 1990s. This historical legacy has a huge 
impact on how quickly a market economy can be 
established and emphasises the importance of the 
historical background and initial conditions at the 
beginning of the transition in the direction and speed 
of financial sector development and its impact on 
economic growth.  
Prior to transition, banking institutions in Central 
Asia and the Baltic States were essentially units of the 
Soviet banking network, that is, part of the 
monobank-type banking system. This was created by 
the banking reforms of 1930-32 and it was not until 
1988 that commercial banks were established. The 
banking system consisted of Gosbank (the State 
Bank) and a few specialist banks. Gosbank combined 
the services of both central and specialist banks, 
thereby taking responsibility for all transactions. As 
the centre for all accounts, Gosbank monitored the 
payment of wages and managed the financing of 
enterprises according to the central plan, which 
involved extending short-term credit in the form of 
working capital. In the role of Central Bank, Gosbank 
issued national currency and acted as banking sector 
regulator although did not engage in activities 
undertaken by their western counterparts such as open 
market operations or setting interest rate policy. 
Apart from Gosbank, other banks were 
established to take responsibility for particular 
transactions. Sberbank handled personal savings 
accounts, Promstroybank supported industry and 
construction projects, Vneshtorgbank was concerned 
with business related foreign exchange transactions 
and Agroprombank supported agriculture sector. 
Gosbank and the specialist banks collected data on 
expenditure and allocated funds to be used throughout 
the Soviet economy. In turn, the financial systems of 
the Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania acted as regional 
departments of these five Soviet banks.  
Banking theory states that a financial system 
consists of bank and non-bank financial institutions 
that act as intermediates to satisfy the supply and 
demand for funds. However, in the former USSR 
financial markets did not exist and funds were not 
allocated efficiently. Rather, all investment decisions 
were made centrally by Gosplan (State Planning 
Committee of the USSR) and were taken on 
ideological and political grounds rather than on the 
basis of economic efficiency.  
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
countries differed in their transition programmes, with 
the Central Asia republics taking a slow, step-by-step 
approach to reform while the Baltic States supported a 
more aggressive path from a planned to a market 
economy. One crucial part of the transition was the 
decision to allow the entry of foreign owned financial 
institutions to the domestic sector and this was 
embraced more enthusiastically in the Baltic States 
than in Central Asia, see Table 1. Moreover, banking 
system reform overall is more advanced in the Baltic 
States, as shown by the EBRD indices. The rapid 
advances have continued in other aspects of the 
economy and the Baltic States are already members of 
the European Union. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Key Financial Indicators 
 
Countries 
Number of Banks (foreign 
owned) 
EBRD Banking Reform 
index 
EBRD Non-banking 
Reform index 
2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009 
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan 35 (15) 39 (14) 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.7 
Kyrgyz Republic 19 (9) 21(10)* 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.0 
Tajikistan 12 (3) 13 (4) 2.0 2.3 1.0 1.0 
Uzbekistan 31 (5) 29 (5)** 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 
Baltic States 
Estonia 9 (6) 17 (14) 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.7 
Latvia 23 (9) 27 (18) 3.7 3.7 3.0 3.0 
Lithuania 12 (6) 17 (5) 3.3 3.7 3.0 3.3 
 
Source: EBRD Statistics. These are the most recent data available to date. *2008, **2007 
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3. Empirical Studies on Banking 
Efficiency in Transition Countries 
 
Compared with the huge literature on the US market, 
research on bank efficiency in emerging market 
economies is relatively scarce. Some studies do focus 
on transition economies but very few have 
specifically addressed the late reforming countries of 
Central Asia, concentrating rather on Central and 
Eastern Europe where there is a history of competitive 
banking institutions prior to 1945 and where there are 
several years of available data. Of these, the majority 
focus on measuring the performance of banks 
following privatisation or the impact of foreign 
ownership on domestic institutions. 
An early transition study is Kraft and Tirtiroğlu 
(1998), which estimated the efficiency of resource 
allocation and output levels using a stochastic cost 
frontier. Data from 43 Croatian commercial banks 
between 1994-1995 show that new banks were not as 
efficient as long established ones and the older banks 
were more profitable. However, high profitability 
does not always indicate high efficiency in banking. 
Even after privatisation, pre-existing large domestic 
banks in Croatia remained, providing unfair 
competition in the sector and creating difficulties for 
new banks as they tried to become established. In the 
Croatia context racial conflict during the 1990’s 
discouraged foreign banks from entering this market, 
although now there is a high level of foreign 
participation and investment from abroad has 
increased substantially. Thus, efficiency, especially 
scale efficiency, has increased as a result of higher 
levels of competition. A similar study of the financial 
sector in Poland used non-parametric methods to 
construct a Malmquist Productivity Index (Piesse and 
Rogowski, 1997), with results suggesting that the 
quality of bank management and the level of 
enumeration were important in an assessment of 
efficiency and competitiveness. 
The affect of enterprise and banking reforms on 
the banking sector development in a sample of 
transition economies was investigated by Fries and 
Taci (2002) using data on 515 banks for 1994-99. 
Their results showed that the speed of the real 
expansion of bank loans is lower than that of output 
growth, even in countries with advanced reform 
programmes. These findings confirm the need for 
policy to strengthen the supply response of banks in 
transition economies. Using the same sample, Fries, 
Neven and Seabright (2002) investigated the 
performance and profitability of banks. Firstly, they 
used patterns of profitability to identify whether these 
banks exhibit excessive risk-taking behaviour. 
Although there is no evidence for this in countries 
with advanced banking and enterprise reforms, poorly 
capitalised banks do exhibit excessive risk-taking 
where the system is less developed. Estimates of cost 
and revenue functions show negative return on equity, 
although there is considerable progress in terms of 
smaller margins on loans and increased levels of 
deposits in those countries where the institutions are 
more advanced. However, loan management 
improved in all the sample countries, regardless of the 
progress of reform. 
The lifting of restrictions on foreign ownership 
of newly privatised banks has been a major focus of 
research on the transition. Buch (1997) was an early 
examination of the role of foreign banks in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungry and Poland using data 
from 1989 to 1995. The results found that 
liberalisation and market entry of foreign banks into 
the banking sector of transition economies improved 
competition, encouraged knowledge transfers, 
allowed more efficient allocation of financial 
resources and helped to prevent future non-
performing loans from accumulating. Moreover, 
sequencing was important and the domestic banks in 
transition States needed to be capitalised early to 
allow them to reduce their existing non-performing 
loans before allowing foreign investors to enter. This 
was to protect the incumbent banks from unfair 
competition before they were operating efficiently.  
This was confirmed by Bonin and Wachtel (1998) 
who followed the development of the banking sector 
in the three fast-track Eastern European economies, 
Poland, Hungry and the Czech Republic. Each 
established a two-tier banking system, removed bad 
loans from the balance sheet and recapitalised the 
banks, and undertook privatisation programmes to 
transfer ownership from the state to private investors, 
both domestic and foreign, although the level of 
foreign ownership varied between countries.  
Another study using Croatian bank data from 
1995 to 2000 found that foreign banks were on 
average most efficient and that new banks were more 
efficient than long established ones (Jemric and 
Vujcic, 2002), contrary to the earlier study by Kraft 
and Tirtiroğlu (1998) discussed above. Jemric and 
Vujcic (2002) also note that strong equalisation in 
terms of average efficiency was evident in the 
Croatian banking market, both between and within 
banks. Small banks had high efficiency scores, which 
were justified by their position as niche players. The 
results suggested that the most significant cause of 
inefficiency amongst the long established State-
owned banks was firstly the size of the workforce, 
suggesting over-employment, and second, high levels 
of fixed assets. That is, between one half and two-
thirds of the inefficient banks had excess labour and 
too high costs of fixed assets.  
In a multiple country study, Fries and Taci 
(2005) investigated how the transformation of 
banking system has progressed in 15 Eastern 
European countries for 1994 to 2001. Parametric and 
non-parametric measures of efficiency are compared 
and the stochastic frontier was the preferred method. 
Privatised banks with majority foreign ownership 
were the most efficient. Thus, there is a consensus 
emerging that private ownership and control increases 
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competitiveness and efficiency and the only 
difference is the speed at which this is apparent in the 
data. More recently, Tochkov and Nenovsky (2010) 
examined the efficiency levels and their determinants 
of Bulgarian banks for the period 1999-2007. Their 
results indicated that foreign banks were more 
efficient than domestic private banks although the gap 
is diminishing over time. Additionally, the results 
show that capitalisation, liquidity and enterprise 
restructuring improved efficiency although banking 
reforms had a negative impact, which is difficult to 
justify. And finally, Karas et al. (2010) examine 
whether efficiency is related to bank ownership in 
Russia and find that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic private banks, confirming the literature 
on foreign ownership. However, their evidence 
indicates domestic public banks are more efficient 
than domestic private banks and the efficiency gap 
between them did not fall even after the introduction 
of deposit insurance in 2004. 
However, the issue of public versus private 
ownership and efficiency may be a function of the 
underlying level of development. Claessens et al. 
(2000) examined the effect of foreign bank entry into 
the domestic sector using 7900 bank observations 
from 80 countries for 1988 to 1995. These included 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and 
Russia in the transition economy group and several 
OECD countries in the market economy group. The 
paper investigated whether foreign and domestic 
banks have different net interest margins, overheads, 
tax liability and profitability. The results suggest that 
domestic banks have lower profits than foreign banks 
in developing countries while the opposite is true in 
developed countries. This is due to greater 
competition and higher levels of efficiency in banks 
in long established market economies. In addition, 
there is evidence that the reduction in profitability and 
margins in domestic banks in developing countries is 
associated with the increased presence of foreign 
banks and skills transfer and knowledge spillovers in 
general benefit the domestic sector. This is unlikely to 
be the case in OECD countries as these are the home 
nations of the foreign banks in emerging and 
developing markets. 
A number of studies have considered the impact 
of foreign ownership using cost and profit frontiers. 
Bonin et al. (2005) investigated the effects of 
ownership, especially by a strategic foreign owner, on 
bank efficiency for eleven transition countries in an 
unbalanced panel data from 1996 to 2000. Using a 
stochastic frontier approach, they estimated profit and 
cost efficiency taking account of both time and 
country effects directly. In second-stage regressions, 
the study used the efficiency measures along with 
return on assets to investigate the influence of 
ownership type. They concluded that privatisation by 
itself was not sufficient to increase bank efficiency as 
state-owned banks were not appreciably less efficient 
than domestic private banks. They found that foreign-
owned banks were more cost-efficient than other 
banks and that they also provided better service. A 
similar paper by Nikiel and Opiela (2002) considered 
the characteristics of bank customers and used a 
distribution-free approach to study the efficiency of 
43 Polish banks from 1997 to 2000. Inefficiency from 
random factors was separated into that affecting costs 
and profits, and the characteristics of the banks were 
explored by examining foreign ownership, asset size 
and customer-type variables. Foreign banks were 
found to be generally more cost-efficient than 
domestic banks, but this was due to a concentrated on 
foreign customers. Foreign banks with many domestic 
customers were found to be no more cost-efficient 
than private domestic banks.  
Also using profit and cost frontiers, Hasan and 
Marton (2003) examined the development of the 
Hungarian banking sector between 1993 and 1997 to 
estimate inefficiency. The establishment of a two-tier 
banking sector, privatisation and the entry of foreign 
banks were the most significant factors in 
strengthening the banking system. Moreover, banks 
with foreign involvement are more profit and cost 
efficient than their domestic counterparts. However, a 
cost function is rarely possible for transition 
economies as data on prices are poor and where they 
exist there is little variation across the sector. More 
recently Fang et al. (2011) examined the cost and 
profit efficiency of the banking sector in six countries 
of South-Eastern Europe for the period 1998-2008. 
Using a stochastic frontier approach the result show 
average cost efficiency of 68.59% and the average 
profit efficiency of 53.87%. Estimation of the 
determinants of bank efficiency indicates that foreign 
banks have higher profit efficiency, but lower cost 
efficiency. However, the efficiency gap between 
foreign, domestic and state banks are also shrinking 
over time. Additionally, the results show institutional 
development has a positive impact on bank efficiency. 
The literature is less prolific on the Baltic States 
although some papers include these countries along 
with other transition economies. Dracos (2003) 
considered net interest margins in Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. This used a 
dealership model, where banks are assumed to be 
risk-averse dealers in the credit market. Risk aversion 
of banks is justified on three grounds; (a) a dealer 
cannot satisfy depositors request for liquidity 
(liquidity shock), (b) a dealer holds an unmatched 
portfolio of assets and liabilities (interest rate risk), 
and (c) bank credit borrowers cannot match their 
obligations (default risk). Given these scenarios, the 
transition process has been successful to some extent 
as margins have decreased over time. Additionally, 
the results indicate that foreign bank entry has also 
contributed to the reduction of margins. More recently 
Brissimis et al. (2008) examined the relationship 
between banking sector reform and bank performance 
using efficiency and total factor productivity for a 
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sample of EU member countries including those in 
Eastern European countries and the Baltic States. Not 
surprisingly, banking sector reform was found to have 
a positive impact on efficiency. 
Finally, a few studies focus on Central Asia. 
These include Fries and Taci (2002), Fries, Neven and 
Seabright (2002), Grigorian and Manole (2002) and 
Peresetsky (2010) on Kazakhstan, Fries and Taci 
(2002) on the Kyrgyz Republic and Djalilov and 
Piesse (2011) on Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, although in all cases the 
data are very incomplete. Now there is reasonable 
time series data for individual banks in the region to 
allow a further examination of the national banking 
sectors to provide further insights into this difficult 
but interesting and potentially critical group of 
countries. Further, it allows comparisons with banks 
of the Baltic States, given their common status as 
previous Republics of the Soviet Union.  
 
4. Modelling Bank Performance in 
Transition Economies 
 
Over the last two decades the banking industry of the 
transition economies has experienced various 
structural, institutional, regulatory and technological 
changes and the introduction of modern methods of 
communication and complex financial instruments 
has considerably changed the banking activities in 
these post-communist countries. Banking is central to 
the economy and therefore it is particularly important 
that progress in the sector is measured and 
understood. Furthermore, banking in the late 
reforming transition economies remains largely 
regulated by government. The interesting focus is the 
similar recent history of the former Soviet Republics, 
their common legacy of central direction by Gosbank 
in Moscow but their different paths to reform 
following independence. Comparisons between the 
two groups are expected to be a function of the speed 
of growth and quality of the institutions, their 
different initial conditions and the extent to which the 
state has removed restrictions on foreign ownership.  
The first stage in modelling bank performance is 
to define inputs and outputs as bank activities are 
based on the flow of funds into and out of the 
organisation. Traditionally, banking research has 
taken one of two approaches. The first is that a bank 
undertakes financial intermediation between lenders 
with funds and borrowers who require funds for 
investment purposes (the intermediation approach) 
while the second considers the bank as a productive 
firm, which produces financial services using labour 
and capital (the production approach). Alternative 
methods are the Asset, User cost and Value Added 
approaches to describe bank functions and identify 
bank outputs (Berger and Humphrey (1992)). In the 
Asset approach, banks are simply intermediaries 
between liability holders and those who receive bank 
assets. Therefore, liabilities are considered inputs 
while loans and other assets are outputs. However, 
this has some limitations as it excludes some other 
important services provided by most banks to their 
depositors (for example, investment advice, 
insurance, brokerage, etc.). The User cost approach 
determines bank output based on each instruments’ 
net contribution to bank revenue, that is, if the 
financial cost of a liability is smaller than its 
opportunity cost, or if the financial return of an asset 
is higher than its opportunity cost, an instrument is 
considered to be an output, otherwise it is an input 
(Berger and Humphrey (1992)). However, this 
approach is very sensitive to data changes, which may 
cause some instruments to be outputs in one period 
and inputs in another and this is very destabilising in a 
linear programming model. Also it is difficult to 
measure the net contribution of each instrument as 
some implicit revenues exist in banks. Finally, the 
Value Added approach supports the view that all 
liabilities and assets have some output characteristics. 
Instruments with higher Value Added, determined by 
actual operating cost, are considered outputs, while 
others are treated as unimportant outputs or as inputs. 
This differs from the User cost approach in that Value 
Added is based on actual operating cost rather than 
determining these costs explicitly (Grigorian and 
Manole (2002); Berger and Humphrey (1992)). Thus, 
in the Value Added approach major products such as 
deposits (demand, savings and time accounts (or 
inflation)) and loans are considered to be outputs as 
they attract the majority of Value Added in the sector, 
while products with insignificant Value Added 
(purchased funds, federal funds, foreign deposits etc.) 
are inputs since they require very small amounts of 
capital and labour.  
 
4.1 Efficiency measurement 
 
Efficiency measurement is now established in the 
literature and is particularly appropriate to the 
financial services sector as the nature of inputs and 
outputs are common across countries and 
organisations.
1
 Over the last few decades many 
studies in production economics have focused on 
measuring the efficiency of different sectors and firms 
in a number of countries. Although many different 
methods have been used, all are based on the 
transformation function, particularly that which 
describes a production technology at the level of the 
organisation. The aim is to maximise value under the 
available technology, prices or other limitations. 
Assuming a common set of constraints, efficiency is 
measured as the distance between individual 
production entities and the best practice frontier.  
The measurement of firm level efficiency was 
first proposed by Farrell (1957). This considers a 
simple production process of two inputs and one 
output to introduce efficiency measurement. 
However, any change in output can be attributed to 
changes in: (1) inputs; (2) technical efficiency; and (3) 
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technical progress. However, the measurement here is 
dual: (1) the minimum amount of inputs needed to 
produce the given amount of output (input-oriented 
efficiency measurement); alternatively, (2) the 
maximum amount of output produced with the given 
amount of inputs (output-oriented efficiency 
measurement). If the productive unit exhibits 
constant-returns-to-scale (CRS), the measurements for 
technical efficiency defined by these two approaches 
will be equal. The efficiency of a firm is measured by 
the distance from the frontier defined by the available 
technology. That is, a firm can be technically efficient 
if it produces the maximum amount of output with the 
transformation of available inputs and allocatively 
efficient if it minimises costs by the choice of this 
input combination to produce the maximum amount 
of output. If the firm is both technically and 
allocatively efficient, then it produces the maximum 
amount of profit and becomes profit efficient. In this 
case, the firm chooses the correct mix of inputs 
minimising the production costs with the given input 
prices, produces the maximum amount of output 
using the available technology and correct production 
scale, and reaches the highest possible profit. Thus, a 
firm becomes technically, allocatively and scale 
efficient. The efficiency of a firm is measured by the 
distance from the frontier defined by the available 
technology. That is, a firm can be technically efficient 
if it produces the maximum amount of output with the 
transformation of available inputs and allocatively 
efficient if it minimises costs by the choice of this 
input combination to produce the maximum amount 
of output. If the firm is both technically and 
allocatively efficient, then it produces the maximum 
amount of profit and becomes profit efficient. In this 
case, the firm chooses the correct mix of inputs 
minimising the production costs with the given input 
prices, produces the maximum amount of output 
using the available technology and correct production 
scale, and reaches the highest possible profit. Thus, a 
firm becomes technically, allocatively and scale 
efficient.    
The best practice frontier can be constructed 
using either a parametric or nonparametric techniques. 
The non-parametric method uses linear programming, 
while econometric models estimate deterministic or 
stochastic frontiers. The approach can be 
deterministic, where all deviations from the frontier 
are attributed to inefficiency, or stochastic, where it is 
possible to discriminate between random errors and 
differences in inefficiency. Both allow the calculation 
of firm level efficiency. The stochastic frontier model 
was proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), 
and extended to include the characteristics of the firm 
that explain the inefficiency, following the work of 
Battese and Coelli (1995). Further, the stochastic 
frontier method conforms to production theory and 
offers flexibility.
2
 In this paper the stochastic frontier 
was used to estimate profit efficiency. A cost or profit 
frontier
3
 is estimated that decomposes the error term 
into random disturbances that are distributed iid and a 
firm specific element that is assumed to have a 
positive half normal distributed above (below) the 
cost (profit) frontier. This captures aspects such as the 
level of managerial competence, governance issues or 
approach to risk. 
The second part of the paper focuses in 
explaining differences in the efficiency levels, both by 
bank and by region, and compares the progress of 
transition in Central Asia and the Baltic States. Thus, 
profit efficiency is modelled as a function of the 
quality of the institutions and the extent of foreign 
ownership in the banking sector. 
 
4.2 Data and variable definitions 
 
Outputs and inputs for the efficiency measurement are 
chosen in such a way that the main functions of banks 
such as profit maximisation, risk management, service 
provision, intermediation, and utility provision are 
represented. According to Grigorian and Manole 
(2002) these functions could be combined into two 
larger groups: profit maximisation (a combination of 
profit maximisation and risk management) and 
service provision (a mixture of service provision, 
intermediation and utility provision). However, it is 
reasonable to assume a bank that is maximising profit 
also attempts to improve service quality. Therefore, 
any bank operation has some elements of profit 
maximisation as well as service provision.  
Following Colwell and Davis (1992), and taking 
account of data limitations for the sample countries, 
the Asset approach that considers banks as financial 
intermediaries is used here. Moreover, some recent 
studies show that the intermediation approach is 
preferable to the production approach in inter-bank 
studies, because the production models are unable to 
weight the contribution of each banks’ service to total 
output and thereby fails to cover important bank 
activities. Therefore, the following data are used: 
Total Profit, outputs (Total Loans and Net Fees and 
Commissions), inputs (Price of Borrowed Funds and 
Overheads), and netputs
4
 (Total Equity divided by 
Total Loans and Loan Loss Provisions divided by 
Total Loans). The definitions and sources are in Table 
2. 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
 
Total Profit Net Income after Tax from Income Statement 
Inputs 
1. 
Price of Borrowed 
Funds 
Total Interest Expenses from Income Statement divided by Total Interest 
Bearing Funds (liabilities) from Balance Sheet. 
2. Overheads 
This is Expenses and is equal to the summation of Staff Costs, Operating 
Expenses, Depreciation and Amortisation. 
Outputs 
1. Total Loans Gross Loans from Balance Sheet. 
2. 
Net Fees and 
Commissions 
This is taken from the Income statement (bank revenue) 
Netputs 
1. 
Total Equity divided by 
Total Loans 
Total Equity and Total Loans are from Balance Sheet 
2. 
Loan Loss Provisions 
divided by Total Loans 
Loan Loss Provisions are from Income Statement and Total Loans are from 
Balance Sheet 
 
Source: Bankscope 
 
Although the region of interest is Central Asia, 
the Baltic States are included in the frontier analyses 
to investigate the difference in profit efficiency of the 
banking sector in these countries. The sample 
countries are Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan from Central Asia
5
 and 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the Baltic region. 
The data are from Bankscope and include 86 banks 
(48 from Central Asia with 387 observations and 38 
from the Baltic States with 389 observations) for 
1996-2011. These are the most recent data available 
and it is important to briefly note limitations. First, 
Bankscope data only include the financial statements 
of banks audited by internationally recognised 
auditing companies and currently, not every bank in 
Central Asia is audited by these companies due to the 
high costs incurred. Nevertheless the sample is 
representative of the region. Second, the ownership 
data are available only for the year of the most recent 
financial statement. Therefore, websites of each bank 
were visited to obtain ownership data as past studies 
have shown this to be an important determinant of 
profit efficiency in banks. Only active banks with a 
minimum three years of financial statements are 
included in the sample. Macroeconomic data, namely, 
growth (percentage change of GDP), inflation 
(percentage change in consumer prices) as well as 
EBRD reform indices measuring banking sector 
reform and reform of non-bank financial institutions, 
are from EBRD Statistics 2011.  
The descriptive statistics are in Table 3. From 
the table it is clear that the Baltic States exhibit lower 
mean profit with a smaller standard deviation 
indicating less difference in profit among the banks in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These countries were 
affected negatively by the financial crisis in 2007-
2008, which had a significant impact on the profits of 
the banks in the region over recent years. However, in 
Central Asia the mean of total loans is smaller and 
with a lower standard deviation. Table 3 also indicates 
that the Baltic States generate more net fees and 
commissions, but their expenses on overheads are 
higher compared to those of the Central Asian banks. 
The price of borrowing funds is higher in Central Asia 
and this suggests that either they have higher interest 
expenses or lower levels of interest bearing funds. 
Either way, there is less competition in the sector. 
Banks in Central Asia have higher equity share of 
total loans and of loan loss provisions as a share of 
total loans where the latter indicates that these banks 
are likely to be spending more on writing off 
nonperforming loans as they are still at an early stage 
of the transformation. Table 3 shows that there are 
some negative values in the data, therefore a common 
amount was added to all observations to reach a 
minimum positive unit and avoid difficulties with the 
natural log of a negative value, consistent with the 
literature (Fang et al., 2011).  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (US$ millions) 
 
 Total 
Profit 
Total 
Loans 
Net Fees and 
Commissions 
Price of 
Borrowed 
Funds 
Overheads Total 
Equity / 
Total 
Loans 
Loan Loss 
Provisions/ 
Total 
Loans 
Central Asia 
Mean -17.42 1171.90 15.82 0.05 37.08 4.67 0.03 
Maximum 6686.54 21452.00 229.14 0.37 544.99 1446.71 2.98 
Minimum -8645.69
* 
0.03 -84.21 0.00 0.05 -0.75 -0.72 
Standard 
Deviation 
712.23 3263.60 31.23 0.04 66.64 73.61 0.16 
Observations 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 
Baltic States 
Mean -36.13 2071.11 19.61 0.03 97.60 4.22 0.01 
Maximum 522.39 53572.19 546.69 0.11 3395.68
# 
429.00 0.58 
Minimum 472.04 6132.60 40.76 0.02 400.17 33.65 0.11 
Standard 
Deviation 
472.04 6132.60 40.77 0.02 400.17 33.65 0.11 
Observations 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 
 
Notes: * A state owned bank - BTA Bank JSC (Kazakhstan). # Versobank AS (Estonia) which experienced many mergers and 
acquisitions in the recent past. 
 
4.3 Estimation of the profit frontier and 
efficiency levels 
 
The production function is limited to a single output 
but banks produce multiple services. However, the 
profit function is less restrictive and gives a wider 
range of parameter estimates. Thus it is convenient to 
allow a mix of outputs so profit is maximised as the 
sum of the value of all the outputs, (PiYi), minus the 
costs of the inputs, subject to the constraint of the 
transformation function. Assuming that banks 
maximise expected profits, the normalised restricted 
profit function (Lau, 1976), with the conditioning 
factors included as fixed inputs, is used to model bank 
behaviour.  With a multiple output technology 
producing outputs Y(y1,..,ym), with the respective 
expected output prices P (p1,..,pm), using n inputs X 
(x1,..,xn) with prices W (w1,..,wn) a general expression 
for expected profits can be defined: 
 
XW-YP = xw-yp= jj
n
1=j
ii
m
1=i

 
(1) 
 
The estimation of profit efficiency in this paper 
follows the non-standard or alternative specification 
and is modelled as a stochastic frontier.
6
 Using a 
translog functional form, the profit efficiency model 
is specified: 
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(2) 
 
where v is an efficiency term and assumed to 
have a half-normal distribution and u is random noise 
and represents the factors beyond bank management 
control. However, given the model is a profit frontier 
the bank specific component of the error term, v, is 
negative as profit inefficiency moves the bank below 
the best practice frontier. The TP is Total Profit and 
w, y as well as z represent inputs, outputs and netputs 
respectively. To impose linear homogeneity of input 
prices the specification is normalised by one input 
price (w1). A regional dummy is included to control 
for the differences between the Baltic States and the 
Central Asian countries. The efficiency of bank i at 
time t in the context of the stochastic frontier profit 
function can be expressed in terms of the residuals 
 
)](|)[exp( itititit UVUETE   
(3) 
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4.4 Results: profit function and bank 
level efficiency 
 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from the 
profit function. The results show that the stochastic 
frontier is the appropriate model as shown by the 
value of Wald Chi-square. They also indicate that 
Total Loans, Net Fees and Commissions and Total 
Equity divided Total Loans have a significant and 
positive impact on bank profits in the Baltic States 
and Central Asian countries. This is consistent with 
the theoretical assumption that a larger loan book and 
greater net fees and commissions plus total equity as a 
share of loans results in higher profit.  
 
Table 4. Stochastic Frontier Profit Function Estimates 
 
Variables Coefficients Standard errors z P>|z| 
Total Loans 26.09 7.48 3.49 0.00 
Net Fees and Commissions 10.25 4.47 2.29 0.02 
Overheads/Price of Borrowed Funds -11.53 11.15 -1.03 0.30 
Total Equity/Total Loans 18.20 3.87 4.70 0.00 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans 1.23 1.29 0.96 0.34 
Total Loans
2
/2 -1.81 1.06 -1.70 0.09 
Net Fees and Commissions
2
/2 0.61 0.016 3.87 0.00 
(Overheads/Price of Borrowed Funds)
2
/2 -1.65 0.29 -5.79 0.00 
(Total Equity/Total Loans)
2
/2 -0.23 0.073 -3.19 0.00 
(Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans)
2
/2 0.04 0.027 1.31 0.19 
Total Loans*Net Fees and Commissions -1.30 0.56 -2.30 0.02 
Total Loans* (Overheads/Price of Borrowed Funds) 0.99 1.23 0.81 0.42 
Total Loans* (Total Equity/Total Loans) -1.13 0.56 -2.02 0.04 
Total Loans* (Loan Loss Provisions/Total Loans) -0.40 0.14 -2.95 0.00 
Net Fees and Commissions* (Overheads/Price of Borrowed 
Funds) 
-0.22 0.34 -0.64 0.52 
Net Fees and Commissions* (Total Equity/Total Loans) -0.89 0.52 -1.72 0.09 
Net Fees and Commissions* (Loan Loss Provisions/Total 
Loans) 
0.44 0.14 3.16 0.00 
(Overheads/Price of Borrowed Funds)* (Total Equity/Total 
Loans) 
1.76 1.24 1.43 0.15 
(Overheads/Price of Borrowed Funds)* (Loan Loss 
Provisions /Total Loans) 
-0.44 0.96 -4.55 0.00 
(Total Equity/Total Loans)*( Loan Loss Provisions/Total 
Loans) 
-0.54 0.15 -3.48 0.00 
Constant -167.71 36.22 -4.63 0.00 
Number of observations 737 
Wald chi 
square 
1575.15  
Log Likelihood -309.93 
Prob>chi 
squared 
0.00  
 
The efficiency scores are reported in columns 2–
5 in Table 5. These are for the entire period for 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 2000-2011 for the 
Kyrgyz Republic and 2004- 2011 for Tajikistan, due 
to missing data. These suggest that for all countries 
profit efficiency significantly improved over the 
period, although Tajikistan is the smallest in the 
region and lags behind, which is not surprising as this 
is the least developed country in Central Asia. The 
overall mean is the highest in Kazakhstan, with the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan in second and third 
positions, respectively. These results are consistent 
with the EBRD reform scores for banking and non-
banking financial institutions as shown in Table 1. 
The efficiency scores for the Baltic States are in 
columns 6–8. These suggest that Latvia had the 
lowest profit efficiency score in 1996 compared to 
that of Estonia and Lithuania, however, it 
significantly improved over the period and converged 
with the levels of Estonia and Lithuania. The profit 
efficiency scores of the Baltic States were highly 
volatile for the period 1996-2003. However, starting 
from 2004 the profit efficiency of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania stabilised and remained above 70% for 
most of the subsequent years. 
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Table 5. Mean profit efficiency scores for Central Asia and Baltic States 
 
Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan Uzbekistan Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
1996 0.38 - - 0.18 0.85 0.48 0.76 
1997 0.69 - - 0.27 0.81 0.79 0.67 
1998 0.59 - - 0.25 0.73 0.61 0.67 
1999 0.71 - - 0.34 0.77 0.63 0.58 
2000 0.64 0.23 - 0.42 0.68 0.65 0.63 
2001 0.58 0.35 - 0.43 0.57 0.66 0.71 
2002 0.64 0.52 - 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.78 
2003 0.62 0.68 - 0.48 0.69 0.78 0.81 
2004 0.63 0.72 0.27 0.38 0.73 0.80 0.84 
2005 0.65 0.63 0.45 0.36 0.76 0.79 0.82 
2006 0.61 0.72 0.48 0.50 0.76 0.80 0.78 
2007 0.66 0.70 0.61 0.62 0.74 0.75 0.74 
2008 0.68 0.63 0.33 0.66 0.74 0.73 0.69 
2009 0.68 0.63 0.31 0.64 0.68 0.80 0.71 
2010 0.73 0.75 0.37 0.67 0.77 0.80 0.74 
2011 0.70 0.80 0.34 0.68 0.81 0.80 0.72 
Total 0.64 0.61 0.40 0.46 0.73 0.73 0.73 
 
In Table 6, the two regions are compared. As 
expected from the relative progress through the 
transition for these countries, the Baltic States are 
overall more efficient. The mean is higher in the 
Baltic States, however, the Central Asian countries 
had a higher growth in efficiency over the period, 
with the aggregate scores 0.2782 in 1996 and 0.6306 
in 2011. The fall in Central Asia in 2000, 2001 and 
2004 is likely to be due to the entry of the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajik banks as efficiency in the early 
years was very low. The Baltic States had efficiency 
scores ranging from 70% to 78% for the whole 
period, with a lower growth rate, but from a higher 
starting point. 
 
Table 6. Comparison of profit efficiency in Central Asia and the Baltic States 
 
Year Profit Efficiency 
 Central Asia Baltic States Difference 
1996 0.28 0.70 -0.42 
1997 0.48 0.76 -0.28 
1998 0.42 0.67 -0.25 
1999 0.53 0.66 -0.13 
2000 0.43 0.65 -0.22 
2001 0.45 0.65 -0.20 
2002 0.55 0.72 -0.17 
2003 0.59 0.76 -0.17 
2004 0.50 0.79 -0.29 
2005 0.52 0.79 -0.27 
2006 0.58 0.78 -0.20 
2007 0.65 0.75 -0.10 
2008 0.57 0.72 -0.15 
2009 0.57 0.73 -0.16 
2010 0.63 0.77 -0.14 
2011 0.63 0.77 -0.14 
Overall 0.52 0.73 -0.21 
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4.5 Factors determining bank efficiency 
 
This section uses the profit efficiency scores to model 
the determinants of bank performance. The review of 
the literature above indicated the importance of 
ownership, whether by the state or private 
shareholders, and of the impact of foreign control of 
financial institutions. In addition, since the sample is 
comprised of banks in countries in transition to a 
market economy the progress of reform of the 
institutions is important. The model is specified: 
 
itit
ititiiit
ownershipstatetimeownershipforeigntimetimecontrols
EBRDEBRDdummyForeigndummyStateEfficiency


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 
**5
143210
 
(4) 
 
where the dependent variable is obtained from 
the stochastic profit frontier and independent 
variables are ownership, macroeconomic indicators 
(growth and inflation) and EBRD reforms (banking 
reform and reform of non-bank institutions). A 
foreign ownership dummy and a state ownership 
dummy are defined by the majority of bank 
shareholders and when both of them are equal to 0 it 
refers to the benchmark group – domestic private 
banks. Reform is the arithmetic mean of two EBRD 
reform indices, Banking and Non-banking 
institutional reform as both are important in the 
process of the transition. These are not included 
separately as there is a high correlation between the 
indices and using the mean captures both aspects of 
the transition. 
Three variables are included to control for size, 
capitalisation and risk, proxied by the natural 
logarithm of loans, equity and loan loss provisions, 
following Hasan and Marton (2003). The first period 
lag is used to avoid potential reverse causality 
between profit efficiency and bank specific features. 
In addition, a time trend is included. Following Fang 
(2011) the product of the time trend and foreign 
ownership and the time trend and state ownership are 
used to account for potentially different effects of 
these changes on profit efficiency. To control for 
macroeconomic effects growth and inflation are 
included to capture fluctuations in economic activity, 
following Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). Finally, a 
dummy variable is added to account for the 
international financial crisis of 2007-8. No variables 
are used to control for country specific features as 
EBRD reform scores are measured at a country level. 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation 
allow for four basic variance structures: cross-section 
specific heteroskedasticity, period specific 
heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous covariances and 
between period covariances. In this paper, the 
determinants of profit efficiency are modelled using 
GLS with both cross-section and period Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimators where the 
first corrects for heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation and the second corrects 
for heteroskedasticity and general correlation of 
observations within a cross-section. Thus, the 
advantage of these specifications is that they correct 
for the variance structures noted above. The results of 
GLS with cross-section and period SUR 
specifications are in (2) and (3) columns of Table 7 
respectively. The third specification, however, 
includes only control variables with results in (4) 
column. The fourth GLS specification does not use 
GLS weights such as cross-section and period SUR 
and includes all the variable as in the first and the 
second specifications. The results of the fourth 
specification are in (5) column of Table 7.  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
As noted above, the specification included ownership 
by foreign and state entities and where these are both 
omitted the reference is the benchmark group - 
domestic private banks. Table 7 shows that the state 
owned banks are associated with lower profit 
efficiency compared to domestic private banks. 
Although the results of the first and the fourth 
specification indicate foreign owned banks are 
associated with higher profit efficiency compared to 
domestic private banks the variables are insignificant 
in the second and the third specifications. There is a 
similar situation for the interaction between trend and 
foreign ownership and the lagged value of loans, 
where the first is significant only in the second 
specification and the second is significant only in the 
first specification. Therefore these variables do not 
appear to be robust. This differs from the results by 
Hasan and Marton (2003) where the Hungarian 
banking sector has benefited from foreign ownership 
and these banks outperformed the domestic banks in 
terms of profit efficiency.   
The results also indicate that the reforms in both 
banking and non-banking institutions have an 
immediate positive impact on profit efficiency in 
Central Asia. This is consistent with the results by 
Brissims et al. (2008) for the EU member countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including the 
Baltic States. However, the reforms in both banking 
and non-banking institutions become insignificant 
once macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth 
as well as inflation are excluded from the models. 
Clearly these effects are interrelated. In addition, the 
reform indices themselves are not entirely transparent. 
For example, the EBRD banking reform metric for 
Kazakhstan is not monotonic and moved from a value 
of three for 2004-8 but decreases to 2.7 for 2009-10. 
This can be explained by difficulties in measuring or a 
lapse in some aspect of institutional reform. But is it 
important to note that these are the best data available 
even though they may be incomplete.  
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Table 7. Determinants of Profit Efficiency in Central Asia 
 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: Profit Efficiency 
GLS Cross-section GLS Period SUR GLS, no weights, only 
control variables 
GLS, no weights, 
all variables 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant     0.9581*** (0.2336)   
State dummy -1.79*** (0.55) -1.99*** (0.68) -0.71* (0.42) -1.97*** (0.67) 
Foreign dummy 0.31* 0.16)     0.36* (0.19) 
Reform 0.17*** (0.06) 0.16** (0.07)   0.19*** (0.06) 
Reform(-1)         
Loans(-1) 0.022* (0.013)       
Equity(-1)         
Loan Loss 
Provisions(-1) 
        
Crisis dummy 
(2007 and 2008) 
0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 
Trend         
Foreign*Trend   0.03** (0.01)     
State*Trend 0.13*** (0.04) 0.15*** (0.05) 0.05* (0.03) 0.14*** (0.05) 
Growth     X X   
Growth(-1) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01** (0.00) X X -0.01** (0.00) 
Inflation     X X   
Inflation(-1)     X X   
AR(1) 1.19*** (0.15) 1.13*** (0.10) 0.85*** (0.04) 1.11*** (0.09) 
AR(2) -0.33*** (0.12) -0.24** (0.10)   -0.23** (0.10) 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.77 0.78 0.72 0.76 
Durbin Watson 
Statistic 
1.98 1.80 1.74 1.77 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Surprisingly, the results here show that the 
financial crisis in 2007-2008 had a positive impact on 
profit efficiency for the banks in Central Asia, which 
is inconsistent with the existing literature (Fang et al., 
2011).
7
 However, given the Central Asian States are 
not integrated into the international financial system 
this is probably picking up some unobserved factor. 
The coefficient on the interaction between state 
ownership and the time trend is positive, indicating 
that the state owned banks started to catch up with 
domestic private owned banks and are more profitable 
in recent years. This supports the results by Fang et al. 
(2011) and, perhaps, the restructuring, modernisation 
and competition policies of the banking system in the 
Central Asia over the last two decades have 
substantially improved the governance of the 
institutions. Surprisingly, the lagged value of 
economic growth has a negative impact on profit 
efficiency. This differs from the results for the EU 
member countries paper by Brissims et al. (2008) 
where there is a significant positive impact where the 
ratio of total investment to GDP is used as a 
macroeconomic indicator. Again, unexpected results 
simply reaffirm the need for further research into a 
region that is still emerging and has a largely 
underdeveloped financial system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Over the last two decades the countries of the Central 
Asian region implemented restructuring policies 
which significantly improved the banking sector. 
However, these countries followed step-by-step 
(evolutionary) approach of the transition from 
planned to market economy. Other former republics 
of the former Soviet Union, such as the Baltic States, 
adopted a more aggressive approach and are already 
members of the EU. Therefore it is important to 
investigate the differences in profit efficiency and 
examine whether the determinants of the profit 
efficiency in the Baltic States are the same as those in 
Central Asian banks. Thus, this paper compares profit 
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efficiency in these regions and finds that the Baltic 
States have higher scores, however the banks in the 
Central Asia significantly improved their profit 
efficiency during the period under review. In the 
analysis of the determinants of profit efficiency the 
paper focuses only on the Central Asian States as this 
region has been largely neglected in the literature 
compared to the established CEE countries and the 
Baltic region.  
Using a stochastic frontier profit function this 
paper shows that mean profit efficiency is higher in 
the Baltic States compared to the countries of Central 
Asia, although the latter are catching up. Existing 
studies of Central and Eastern European countries 
show that foreign owned banks outperformed 
domestic banks in terms of profit efficiency and 
banking and non-banking institutional reforms have 
had a significant positive impact on efficiency. The 
results for the Central Asian countries also indicate 
that the reforms have had an immediate positive 
impact on profit efficiency, although the coefficient 
becomes insignificant once the macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP growth and inflation are 
excluded from the model. Additionally, the results for 
foreign owned banks are not convincing as they are 
less robust. However, the results are the same for state 
owned banks indicating that they are less profit 
efficient compared to domestic private banks. The 
results for the impact of macroeconomic indicators on 
profit efficiency are inconsistent, that is, current 
economic growth and inflation have no significant 
impact for the Central Asian countries, while the ratio 
of total investment to GDP in CEE countries, 
including the Baltic States, have had a significant 
positive effect on the profit efficiency (Brissims et al. 
(2008). 
Little is known about the impact of the banking 
sector in Central Asia and with the exception of 
Kazakhstan the reforms are progressing very slowly. 
The financial intermediary function of banks with 
respect to domestic and business activity is sluggish at 
best. However, efforts are being made to improve the 
efficiency of the sector and future policy interventions 
must focus on bank performance as the foundation for 
economic growth in the region. 
 
Notes 
 
1 For a comprehensive summary of methods to measure 
bank efficiency see Berger (2007).  
2 Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (1993) for a comprehensive 
survey of methods and applications, Coelli, Rao and Battese 
(1998) for further models and Berger et al. (1993b), Berger 
and Humphrey (1997) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
for applications to banking. 
3 Berger et al. (1995) and Berger and Mester (1997) 
consider a profit function to be preferable for measuring 
bank efficiency. 
4 In the context of production, netput variables are positive 
if the quantity is an output of the production process and 
negative if it is an input to the production process. 
5 Turkmenistan was excluded as the data are unreliable or 
missing. 
6 The function is specified in terms of output quantities and 
input prices. Markets in Central Asia are imperfect with 
robust state intervention, particular in the manipulation of 
output prices. A similar situation is discussed in Humphrey 
and Pulley (1997). 
7 Fang et al., (2011) included a crisis variable but got 
insignificant results using a sample of SEE countries, 
including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania 
and Serbia. 
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